We experimentally study ways in which the social preferences of individuals and groups a¤ect performance when faced with relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these e¤ects. We …nd other-regarding workers tend to depress e¤orts by 15% on average. However, sel…sh workers are nearly three times more likely to lead workers to coordinate on minimal e¤orts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a team of workers has complex consequences for organizational performance.
Introduction
Relative performance incentives are a common feature of the workplace environment. An interesting feature of relative pay is that a worker's performance also a¤ects his or her co-workers'compensation; in particular, it imposes a negative externality. An increase in one's own performance will not only increase one's own compensation, but inevitably also decrease a co-worker's expected pay. How this externality a¤ects the incentives of a worker will crucially depend on whether a worker incorporates this reduction in her own e¤ort decision. It will also depend on other features of the workplace environment.
In this paper, we explore the e¤ects of the social preferences of individuals and group composition on their performance when they are faced with inde…nitely repeated relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these e¤ects.
In particular, we use a controlled laboratory environment to examine two channels through which agents may reduce e¤ort under inde…nitely repeated relative incentives. The …rst one is "other-regarding" concerns: some agents may incorporate other agents'payo¤s into their own e¤ort choice. Thus, other-regarding agents should respond di¤erently to relative incentives compared to "sel…sh" agents. Even though the fact that individuals have heterogeneous degrees of other-regardingness (e.g., see Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fisman, Kariv and Markovitz, 2007) is well-documented in the literature, we know little about the e¤ect of other-regarding concerns on the e¤ectiveness of relative performance incentives. Further, group composition in terms of other-regarding concerns should also determine individual e¤ort in strategic interactions such as relative performance pay. The second channel is inde…nitely repeated relative incentives. Workplace interaction usually takes place for an inde…nite period of time, so the "shadow of the future" may also a¤ect agents behavior (e.g., see Dal Bó 2005). We consider this channel because concerns about future interactions may also mediate the e¤ects of the social preference composition of the group.
The potential for sustained cooperation (or coordination, if we allow for multiplicity of equilibria) in inde…nitely repeated settings motivates the analysis of factors that enable it. In this paper, we further explore the mediating role of communication and leadership on sustaining cooperation over time. Coordinating on low e¤orts seems likely to be driven by the ease with which communication can happen (e.g., see Cooper et al. 1992 ). In addition, the potential for coordination in inde…nitely repeated settings may stimulate leadership emergence (e.g., see Hermalin 2012) . Although leaders make mutually bene…cial outcomes focal in simple coordination games, we know little about their e¤ect on agents'behavior in inde…nitely repeated interactions within a relative performance incentive structure. Leaders in this setting are important since they can direct individuals towards low e¤ort outcomes and their emergence may well be linked to social preferences.
In our experiment, we measure a proxy for subjects' other-regardingness using dictator games. We relate this proxy to their e¤ort and leadership decisions in groups interacting repeatedly and inde…nitely under relative incentives. We randomly divide subjects who have di¤erent levels of other-regardingness into groups and thus identify the e¤ect of group composition on e¤ort. We also consider interactions without communication (the baseline) and with communication, in order to explore the role of verbal leadership on e¤ort outcomes. Regardless of communication, we …nd that groups with more other-regarding workers tend to depress total e¤orts. At the individual level we …nd that when communication is not part of the work environment, each other-regarding group member depresses overall e¤ort by 15%. Outcomes in which all group members depress efforts, rarely occur in this case. Thus, our results are consistent with other-regarding individuals internalizing the externality they impose without engaging in long-term strategic behavior.
Communication is, of course, an important feature of many workplace settings. In an inde…nitely repeated relative performance setting, communication can help workers coordinate their e¤ort choices to their mutual bene…t. To facilitate such coordination it is expected a leader will emerge. Here we use the term leader as a coordinator, as argued by Kreps (1986) and Hermalin (2012) . In our particular setting, we label "leader"as any individual who suggests that the group coordinate on minimal e¤ortwhich is the Pareto optimal outcome from the agents'viewpoint. Controlling for the emergence of this sort of leadership, we …nd that with communication, other-regarding subjects depress their e¤ort relative to sel…sh ones by 50%. We also …nd that sel…sh individuals are 2.7 times more likely than other-regarding individuals to successfully lead their groups to the minimal e¤ort outcome.
This implies that the e¤ect of social preferences on work performance under relative incentives is complex. On the one hand, other-regarding workers have a tendency to depress e¤ort, apparently through the internalizing of their e¤orts' negative externality. On the other hand, with the availability of communication, sel…sh workers seem more likely to help direct the group to the lowest of e¤orts.
In order to eliminate possible confounds such as di¤erences in beliefs or degrees of patience, in the …nal treatment we have subjects face computerized simulated subjects exhibiting choice behavior similar to that of past human subjects. Thus, while strategic incentives are left intact, social preferences are "turned o¤" in this treatment. We …nd suggestive evidence that by the end of the relative performance stage, other-regarding and sel…sh subjects are indistinguishable.
We see the contributions of this paper as threefold. First, we document for the …rst time how individual social preferences a¤ect behavior when facing relative performance incentives in inde…nitely repeated settings. Second, we explore how the composition of a group in terms of individual social preferences a¤ects outcomes. Third, we identify how communication and endogenous leadership mediate these effects as well as how social preferences relate to the emergence of coordinating leaders.
Literature
The signi…cant body of literature that documents di¤erent degrees of social preferences (for example Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fisman, Kariv and Markovitz, 2007; DellaVigna, 2009 ) has led researchers to investigate their e¤ects on public good contributions and other pro-social behaviors (e.g. Loch and Wu, 2008; Dreber, Fudenberg and Rand, 2014 ; Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012; K½ oszegi, 2014). Moreover, Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) point out that when scholars disregard social preferences, they fail to understand the determinants and consequences of incentives. In our paper, we explore the e¤ects of social preferences on productivity in the setting of relative performance incentives (e.g. see Kidd, Nicholas and Rai, 2013; Erkal, Gangadharan, and Nikiforakis, 2011; Rey-Biel, Sheremeta, and Uler, 2012; and Riyanto and Zhang, 2013) . Similar to Gächter and Thöni (2005) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) we use one game (a dictator game as in Andreoni and Miller, 2002) to predict other-regarding concerns and relate those predictions to behavior in the relative performance game. Although our relative performance game is similar to the dilemmas used in those papers (i.e., players are better o¤ if they "cooperate"in low e¤orts), an important di¤erence is that the interactions in our game are inde…nitely repeatedwhich is a common feature of many important settings, such as the workplace. For inde…nitely repeated settings it is not clear a priori whether other-regarding concerns will depress e¤orts due to internalizing the negative externality imposed on others or will instead increase e¤orts due to more lenient punishment in the case of a deviation, which makes sustaining a collusive outcome harder. Consequently, the e¤ects of social preferences seen in inde…nitely repeated games could be quite di¤erent from those captured through the other types of settings commonly found in the extant literature.
The importance of group composition in a dimension other than the degree of other-regardingness has been previously explored. Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez (2009) for example, …nd that relative performance incentives (tournaments in their setting) are less e¤ective than piece rates when participants have heterogeneous abilities. A similar result is found by Backes-Gellner and Pull (2013) in a sales contest within a German insurance …rm. To our knowledge, the e¤ect of group composition in terms of other-regardingness on e¤orts has not been explored, and yet there have been studies that show that individual other-regardingness is important. For example, Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005) allude to the role of social preferences in inde…nitely repeated (or at least long-term) interactions. Although the core of Bandiera et al. (2005) is to compare workers'productivity under piece rate and relative incentives, they also document two results that are related to this paper. First, Bandiera et al. (2005) compare fruit pickers with the aforementioned incentive schemes in two di¤erent settings: one that allows peer monitoring and another one that does not. They …nd that relative compensation leads to lower productivity only when monitoring is allowed. They conclude that monitoring, not social preferences, drives down e¤ort in their setting. The authors keep their monitoring technology and relative incentives constant throughout their study; they also do not exogenously vary their subjects'exposure to altruism. Second, Bandiera et al. (2005) …nd that workers with social ties depress e¤ort. Social ties could capture social preferences; but they could also capture the salience of punishment should one "defect" from low e¤orts. As a result, although this study clearly showed that social ties can reduce e¤orts, it is unclear whether social preferences can do the same. Our paper complements this work by directly measuring participants'social preferences (à la Andreoni and Miller, 2002) and randomly forming groups whose members have varying degrees of social preferences to identify the link between social preferences and behavior, both as a function of individual preferences and group composition.
Inde…nitely repeated settings have been another important area of research: Pareto improvements over the one-shot Nash equilibrium can be obtained as equilibrium outcomes if the value of the future is high enough. 1 However, the fact that cooperation (or "collusion" in the context of competition) can be an equilibrium outcome does not guarantee that subjects will cooperate (Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011, 2014). 2 In fact, it has been documented that the majority of the time individuals do not achieve the Pareto-optimal outcomes (e.g., Palfrey and Rosenthal 1994 …nd cooperation rates from 29% to 40% in public goods games, and Dal Bó (2005) found cooperation rates of 38% in inde…nitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas). Further, there has been a great variety of outcomes in this literature, some of which deviate from standard economic models (see Fudenberg, Rand, and Dreber, 2012) . Our paper complements this work by documenting the role of individual and group social preferences on outcomes in inde…nitely repeated games.
Although theoretically cheap talk communication does not rule out equilibria, empirically it has been found to facilitate coordination in inde…nitely repeated games (Fonseca and Normann 2012; Embrey, Fréchette, and Stacchetti 2013). One channel through which communication helps equilibrium selection in games of coordination is through a leader, as argued by Kreps (1986) and Hermalin (2012) . The theoretical economics literature on leadership has focused on how pre-imposed self-regarding leaders coordinate (e.g. Bolton, Brunnermeier, and Veldkamp 2013), motivate (e.g. Saloner, 1993, 2000) , and signal information through their actions (e.g. Hermalin 1998 ). The role of leaders in these studies is to overcome individuals' incentives to act against the interest of the group. Meanwhile, the experimental literature has focused on whether leaders foster cooperation in social dilemmas, mostly from Hermalin's (1998) leading-by-example perspective. These studies have found 1 Versions of this "folk theorem" can be found in Friedman (1971) or Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) . 2 There is a fairly large experimental literature on collusion, mostly focused on exploring the e¤ect of monitoring (see e.g. Aoyagi and Fréchette 2009; Du¤y and Ochs 2009) and strategic uncertainty (see e.g. Blonski and Spagnolo 2004) . Our focus is on the role of group composition in terms of social preferences on cooperation. For an updated survey on cooperation in in…nitely repeated games see Dal Bó and Fréchette (2014). that leaders indeed spur cooperation, often through reciprocity from followers. 3 To our knowledge one study, Koukoumelis, Levati, and Weisser (2012) , explores leadership through communication in a social dilemma. In their study, the authors exogenously assign the role of "communicator"to one group member in a …nitely repeated voluntary contribution game. They …nd that this one-way "free-form" communication has a large positive e¤ect on contributions. A growing experimental literature studies leaders without pre-imposed salience or authority in …nitely repeated interactions (see e.g. Bruttel and Fischbacher, 2010; Gächter, Nosenzo, Renner and Sefton, 2012; Kocher, Pogrebna and Sutter, 2013; and Arbak and Villeval, 2013) . Also focusing on social dilemmas, this literature has documented that emergent leaders are motivated by e¢ ciency concerns, social image or generosity, and generally contribute more than non-leaders. Our work complements this literature in that we explore the endogenous emergence of leaders in inde…nitely repeated settings, and how this phenomenon relates to social preferences. In addition, whereas we primarily study leadership through communication, most of the other papers study leadership in ‡uence through actions and authority.
Finally, our work also contributes to the literature on communication in games with multiple equilibria (e.g. Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross, 1992; Ledyard, 1995; Seely, Van Huyck and Battalio, 2007); while the extant literature is concerned about the e¤ect of communication on the frequency of Pareto-optimal outcomes, we instead explore how a group's social preference composition leads to patterns of communication (e.g., leadership emergence) that result in players coordinating on their Pareto-optimal outcome.
Experimental Design
In total, we conducted 7 experimental sessions with 147 subjects. Participants were students from UC Berkeley, enrolled in the X-lab subject pool. Sessions lasted approximately 60 minutes from reading instructions to subject payment, which averaged approximately $16 per subject. Participants were not allowed to take part in more than one session. The treatments were programmed and conducted using z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (2007) .
We had the dual purpose of identifying subjects'social preferences and measuring their choices when facing a relative performance incentive scheme. In order to achieve this, the experiment was divided into three stages. In the beginning of the …rst stage, we randomly matched subjects into anonymous groups of three individuals and they remained in the same group for the remainder of this stage. Participants were then given 100 tokens for each of 9 periods and played a dictator game with their group members (including themselves). In each period, participants faced di¤erent "prices"or token exchange rates of giving to each group member. Prices varied such that we could both identify individuals'willingness to give to others and individuals' willingness to give between others when facing di¤erent prices of giving. 4 We use these 9 periods to classify our subjects in terms of social preferences. In periods 10 and 11 we conducted allocation decisions with upwards-sloping budget sets as in Andreoni and Miller (2002) where subjects are given an allocation and decide on the overall exchange rate. In contrast to the previous dictator menus, here there is no possibility to distribute value between oneself and the other group members. The only choice a subject has is on the overall value of the endowment, not on how it is split up. We will use these decisions to test whether aversion to disadvantageous inequality matters in addition to other-regardingness in responding to relative incentives. These results are reported in the Appendix. Finally, since we follow the categorization of Andreoni and Miller (2002) , we are thus exploring unconditional rather than conditional social preferences.
Subjects did not learn their other group members'choices to avoid uncontrolled learning. Participants were told that for 5 out of a total of 11 allocation decisions one of the group members'choices would be randomly selected to compute payo¤s.
We use this …rst stage, in particular decisions in rounds 1 to 9, to classify participants as "Sel…sh"or "Other-Regarding,"consistent with our intended meaning used in section (4) : An archetypal Sel…sh type, is only interested in his own monetary payo¤ and thus should never allocate any tokens to his or her group members. Thus we classify as Sel…sh all subjects that throughout rounds 1-9 do not allocate any tokens to another group member. The remainder of subjects are classi…ed as Other-Regarding. We consider various other possible classi…cations in the analysis found in our online appendix; however, they provide little additional insight to this simple classi…cation.
For the second stage, participants were again randomly matched with two other players for the remainder of the experiment. The purpose of this stage was to give players the possibility to collude by jointly providing low levels of e¤ort. Thus, we implemented an inde…nitely repeated game with continuation probability of = 95%: In order to gain consistency across treatments, we randomly drew the number of periods before running the sessions as in Fudenberg, Rand, and Dreber (2012). In particular, our random draw resulted in 29 periods of relative-performance-pay play, which was then …xed for all subjects, in all treatments.
A subject's per period payo¤ during this stage was calculated as follows:
uses a slightly di¤erent nomenclature to describe distributional preferences. They call preferences for giving the fundamentals that rule the trade-o¤ between individual and others'payo¤s and social preferences the ones that govern the allocation between others. Our study does not focus on that distinction, therefore we employ the following terminology: We use "social preferences" or "other regarding concerns" interchangeably to represent non-sel…sh behavior. where x = x j 3 is the average e¤ort across i 0 s group and i chooses e¤ort x i 2 [1; 12]: 5 Hence, each participant's e¤ort is discounted by the average e¤ort, so a higher average e¤ort will reduce payo¤s, ceteris paribus. This is the relative performance evaluation similar to the contract used by Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005). 6 Note these …gures are in Berkeley Bucks $, converted at $66.6 Berkeley Bucks to 1 US$, which is how it was presented to subjects. 7 Each participant received an endowment of $12 (Berkeley Bucks $) each period from which they could choose costly e¤ort. E¤ort costs $1 for each unit of e¤ort. Subjects were paid the sum of their earnings over all periods for this stage.
The one-shot Nash equilibrium for homogeneous and Sel…sh players is to play x i = 10 for all i; which is below 12 (the upper bound of the action space). Coordinating on x i = 1 under grim-trigger strategies is sustained by a continuation probability > 60% (optimal one-shot deviation from Pareto Dominant outcome is to play x i ' 7:5). Therefore, our = 95% should guarantee the feasibility of coordinating on low e¤orts for utility maximizing rational Sel…sh agents.
After the allocation decisions, for the …nal stage, subjects completed a risk aversion test as in Holt and Laury (2002) , and a basic demographic questionnaire.
We also varied factors considered important for creating and sustaining low levels of e¤ort. In particular, in the …rst treatment ("Chat") we allowed chat via computer terminals during each period and observability of choices and payo¤s after every period. We recorded the chat messages in order to identify coordination leaders and their social preferences. In the second treatment ("No Chat") we did not allow for chat but continued with observability after each period.
If we were able to mechanically switch on and o¤ subject's social preferences, we could directly identify the e¤ect of social preferences on e¤ort. Unfortunately, this is not generally possible. However, we conducted a …nal treatment where we approximate this idea. Instead of facing human subjects, a subject played against their computer, which simulated the play of past subjects'decisions ("Robot"treatment). This treatment attempted to "switch o¤" social preferences by making it clear to subjects that even though they faced the same consequences for their choices as if playing human subjects, their e¤ort decisions no longer a¤ected any person's payo¤s. Table 1 provides a summary of these treatments. 5 Although subjects were not told to do so, almost all entered e¤ort choices as an integer. We had an e¤ort lower bound of 1 to create an upper bound for payo¤s. The e¤ort upper bound of 12 came from the periodic endowment of $12:
6 Note that this is mathematically the same as a Tullock contest played by risk-neutral individuals. That is, the principal has a total pool of 45 Berkeley Bucks to distribute across workers based on their relative performance. 7 A copy of the instructions given to subjects is available in the appendix. Chat  63  No Chat  63  Robot  21  Total  147   Table 1 : Summary of treatments
Treatment Subjects

Hypotheses
Before turning to our results, we develop several hypotheses to guide our ensuing analysis. To ease exposition, we use the label Sel…sh to mean those individuals that only value their own payo¤. In addition, we use the label Other-Regarding to denote those individuals that value both their own payo¤ and some fraction of their parters' payo¤s. 8 In inde…nitely repeated games such as ours, achieving Pareto-dominant outcomes is a well-known theoretical possibility-provided …xed-partners and large enough. However, absent communication, it proves di¢ cult to obtain coordination on the Pareto-dominant outcome experimentally (see e.g. Fonseca, and Normann 2012). This suggests that, in such a setting, subjects will revert to playing noncooperative strategies. Since Other-regarding subjects internalize their negative externality of their e¤ort-level in a relative-pay setting, we expect them to choose less e¤ort than Sel…sh subjects. This logic leads to our …rst hypothesis: Hypothesis 1. Absent communication, Other-Regarding subjects exert lower efforts than Sel…sh subjects.
For the balance of the paper we use the label leader to mean someone who attempts to coordinate others on the Pareto-dominant outcome (i.e., all coordinate on minimal e¤ort). We conceptualize the incentive to become a coordinating leader as the di¤erence between one's payo¤ from a non-coordinating and coordinating equilibrium. Assume, that a subject believes others will behave (on average) as she does (see Mullen et al. 1985, and Engelmann and Strobel, 2000) . In our setting, this means that subjects expect others to play as if they were of the same type (i.e., either Sel…sh or Other-Regarding). Next, consider the Nash stage-game as the non-coordinating equilibrium and the Pareto-dominant equilibrium as the coordinating equilibrium. In this case, it can be shown that, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium outcome yields both Sel…sh and Other-Regarding players the same expected utility. 9 However, in the Nash stage-game equilibrium, Sel…sh players have a lower expected utility compared with Other-Regarding players, since the latter produce lower e¤orts, which increases the overall expected payo¤s. Hence, Sel…sh players have more to gain by coordinating on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. This yields our next hypothesis: Hypothesis 2. Sel…sh subjects are more likely to emerge as leaders Since a leader is most likely needed for achieving the Pareto-dominant outcome (e.g., see Kreps 1986 , and Hermalin 2012), and we expect Sel…sh people are more likely to become a leader (Hypothesis 2), a group with no Sel…sh subjects is less likely to collude (i.e., coordinate on minimal e¤ort) than a group with a Sel…sh player: Hypothesis 3. With communication, collusion is more likely for a group with a Sel…sh player than one with no Sel…sh players.
Ideally, we would like to "turn o¤" and "turn on" social preferences to identify their e¤ects on e¤orts. We can possibly achieve this by pairing individuals with subjects that behave like human subjects but do not incur payo¤s. Speci…cally, other-regarding concerns should not play a role when partners are machines. Thus, if we pair subjects knowingly with computer-simulated subjects, we expect Sel…sh and Other-Regarding subjects to behave similarly.
Hypothesis 4. Sel…sh and Other-Regarding subjects behave similarly when paired with computer simulated subject.
Experimental Results
We begin by classifying subjects in terms of social preferences derived from their giving behavior. We then use these results to study the relationship of individual and the group composition of social preferences and e¤ort, the emergence of leaders, and collusive outcomes. Table 2 summarizes the mean choices of our subjects under all 9 price vectors in treatments: 1) Chat and 2) No Chat. 10 We analyze the Robot treatment in section 5.4.
Categorizing Social Preference Types from Giving Menus
We see that regardless of the price of giving, subjects keep on average just above 70% of their endowment. Using these choices, we sort our subjects into Sel…sh and Other-Regarding. A subject is categorized as Sel…sh if he or she does not allocate any tokens to the other group members in any of the nine periods. All subjects who work under the simplifying assumption that Other-regarding players' utility is a weighted sum of individual payo¤s and weights add up to one. 10 These vectors (a; b; c) represent the price a of giving to one's self, the price b of giving to player 1, and the price c of giving to player 2. Table 2 : Giving rates. at some point allocated tokens to their group members are categorized as Other-Regarding. We explore other categorizations of social preferences in the Appendix. Taking together the two treatments (Chat and No Chat) most of the participants (80.95%) are categorized as Other-Regarding. The remaining subjects (19.05% ) are categorized as Sel…sh. 11 As described in Section 3 subjects were randomly allocated into groups without regard to their social preference type. Figure 1 shows the distribution of Sel…sh subjects across groups. Since subjects were allocated randomly and Sel…sh subjects are relatively rare we do not observe groups with only Sel…sh group members in the Chat and No Chat treatments. Otherwise, we do observe random variations across groups in the number of Sel…sh subjects which we will use to identify the e¤ect of group composition in the next sections. Figure 2 provides a summary of e¤ort choices over time by treatment. In both treatments we observe average e¤ort of around 8 units at the beginning of the relative incentives stage. As expected, there is a strong tendency to coordinate on lower e¤orts over time when subjects are able to communicate in the Chat treatment (dashed line). When communication was absent (No Chat treatment), average e¤ort stays close to the one-shot Nash equilibrium prediction (i.e., 10) for the Sel…sh type (dotted line). How do individual social preferences and group composition relate to e¤orts? To …nd an answer to this question we exploit the random allocation of subjects into groups. We compare behavior of groups with di¤erent numbers of Sel…sh and Other-Regarding individuals in each of the two treatments. Figure 3 gives a …rst overview of our …ndings. Consider …rst panel a). We compare the average e¤ort of subjects categorized as Sel…sh with the average e¤ort of subjects categorized as Other-Regarding. We see that for both treatments, average e¤ort is higher for subjects categorized as Sel…sh, although a t-test rejects equality only for the No Chat treatment (p-values: p<0.60 in Chat and p<0.01 in No Chat). 12 In the No Chat treatment, average e¤orts are similar to the one-shot Nash equilibrium e¤orts (i.e., e¤orts of 10 with = 0) rather than to a collusive outcome and Other-Regarding subjects provide lower e¤orts on average.
Social Preferences and E¤ort
In panel b) we consider average group e¤ort as a function of the number of Sel…sh players within a group. When communication was not possible, we observe that each additional Sel…sh group member modestly increases average group e¤ort though none of these increases reach statistical signi…cance. When communication is possible, there is a pronounced increase in average e¤ort when comparing a group with two Sel…sh group members versus those with fewer Sel…sh members; however, likely due to only one group with two Sel…sh members in the data, the di¤erence does not reach statistical signi…cance. Meanwhile, groups with only one Sel…sh member generate the lowest average e¤ort. We further explore di¤erences in group e¤ort choices as a function of the number of Sel…sh subjects controlling for a number of group characteristics through regression analysis in Table 3 . We use as the dependent variable the group e¤ort averaged over all rounds of play (at stage 2, our relative performance stage) in columns 1 and 2, and averaged over the …nal periods, periods 30-40 in columns 3 and 4. In the Chat treatment, we do not …nd a signi…cant e¤ect of Sel…sh group members. This is likely the result of greater e¤ort from a group with two Sel…sh members cancelling out the reduced e¤ort of the groups with only one Sel…sh member. In contrast, when communication is not possible (No Chat treatment), each Sel…sh group member increases average group e¤ort by approximately .9 units over all periods on average, which equals a 9% increase over our baseline mean e¤ort of roughly 9.7 per period.
Overall, these results suggest that, absent communication, average e¤orts are consistent with one-shot Nash equilibrium strategies. When communication is introduced, however, e¤orts seem to follow the collusive outcome and results are somewhat surprising: The presence of one Sel…sh individual leads to lowest aggregate e¤orts. Table 3 : E¤ect of groups'social preference composition on group e¤ort. This is due to Sel…sh individuals being more likely to lead by suggesting coordination on low e¤orts, as we …nd in Section (5:3). Before turning there, we explore further the e¤ect of group composition on e¤orts in the No Chat treatment.
No-Chat Treatment
To disentangle the e¤ect of an individual's social preferences from group composition e¤ects, we estimate a random e¤ects model for the No Chat treatment, clustering standard errors at the group level. 13 The dependent variable is individual e¤ort and the explanatory variables are: Sel…sh and the number of other Sel…sh individuals in each group (# Other Sel…sh). We control for # Other Sel…sh since, as given in Section (4) ; we expect Sel…sh and Other-Regarding players to in ‡uence e¤orts di¤erently, both through their own e¤orts and through possible leadership by example. This means that we are exploring the e¤ect of individual social preferences conditional on how many other Sel…sh players are in one's group. Table 4 reports our results. We …nd further evidence that Other-Regarding subjects choose signi…cantly less e¤ort. Controlling for group composition, these subjects choose 1.5 fewer units of e¤ort over all periods. The group composition e¤ect on the other hand, is positive but insigni…cant. Thus, absent communication, Other-Regarding subjects depress e¤orts relative to Sel…sh subjects, but only through the channel of individual social preferences. This provides our …rst primary result, which is consistent with our …rst hypothesis: Table 4 : E¤ect of own and others social preferences on own e¤ort (No Chat).
Chat and Leadership
In the Chat treatment, a subject can take the initiative through chat, asking the group members to jointly exert low e¤ort. This coordinating leader can then overcome the equilibrium selection problem. From the content of chat messages we label a "Min-E¤ort Leader"as a subject that is the …rst to propose coordinating on the minimum e¤ort case (i.e., for all group members to provide e¤ort of 1). 14 We identify 13 Min-E¤ort Leaders (21%) among the 63 subjects (21 groups) in the Chat treatment. 15 Figure 4 reports the distribution of social preference types in the sample of Min-E¤ort Leaders and Non-Min-E¤ort Leaders. We observe that Sel…sh individuals are more likely to be leaders. A Pearson chi-squared test shows this di¤erence is signi…cant at the 5% level (p=0.03).
Do social preferences a¤ect outcomes in the Chat treatment beyond the likelihood of a Sel…sh subject emerging as a coordinating leader? Table 5 reports the results of a random e¤ects model exploring individual e¤ort choices. Column 1 shows a regression without considering leader emergence, analogous to the results reported in Table 4 for the No Chat treatment. In column 2 we add a control for whether a Min-E¤ort Leader has emerged and whether the subject herself is a Min-E¤ort Leader. Notice that the coe¢ cients of own social preference as well as group members' social preferences are highly signi…cant and larger in magnitude once controlling for 14 We initially collected two other categories of leadership. A "Failed Leader" to denote a subject that called on his group members to decrease e¤orts but was not listened to/followed. This is a rare event in our study and thus we do not include this variable in our analysis. We also considered a "First Leader," which was the …rst subject to propose coordination of e¤orts. However, this latter category has little explanatory power and so we omit it from our analysis. 15 We also had both a research assistant from Erasmus University Rotterdam and from Northwestern University independently code the leadership variables. The instructions given to the RAs are provided in the appendix. The correlations between the alternative leadership dummies and the ones we use in the paper are for Northwestern: 0.88 for whether a Min-E¤ort Leader exists (on a period/group level) and 0.82 for the subject being a Min-E¤ort Leader (subject level); and for Rotterdam 0.52 for whether a Min-E¤ort Leader exists and 0.56 for the subject being a Min-E¤ort Leader. For both of these classi…cations, we …nd similar results in our following analysis. (1) Table 5 : E¤ect of social preferences on individual e¤ort controling for leadership (Chat treatment).
leadership in this way. This means that after controlling for the e¤ect of social preferences in ‡uencing leadership emergence, social preferences lead to signi…cantly lower group e¤orts. The e¤ect is slightly larger in magnitude than in the No Chat treatment. Precisely, a Sel…sh subject puts in 2 units e¤ort more per period than an Other-Regarding subject, after controlling for the emergence of a coordination leader. Furthermore, the presence of an additional Sel…sh group member increases a subject's own e¤ort by 2 units per period also controlling for leader emergence. Column 3 includes interactions of social preference measures and the emergence of a leader. We …nd that social preferences depress e¤orts when a Min-E¤ort Leader has not emerged in a group. Other-regarding subjects depress their e¤ort relative to sel…sh ones by about 30%. Once a leader emerges there is no di¤erence between Sel…sh and Other-Regarding choices. Sel…sh are thus no more likely to deviate from a collusive outcome. Finally, note that the coe¢ cient of Min-E¤ort Leader is insigni…cant. Thus, Min-E¤ort Leaders do not lead also by good example: i.e., they only lead through suggesting low e¤ort by chat message and not through actually initiating lower e¤ort themselves. Column 4 reports estimates from only the last 11 periods of play and …nds results similar to those reported in column 3.
We conclude that social preferences are an important determinant of group e¤ort also in the Chat treatment, though in a more nuanced way. On the one hand, subjects can use communication to coordinate the group on a collusive outcome. Such a "leader" tends to be a Sel…sh individual, which is consistent with our second Hypothesis from Section (4). This explains why the presence of one Sel…sh individual reduces e¤orts in the Chat treatment. On the other hand, controlling for the relation of leadership and social preferences, Other-Regarding subjects have a tendency to put in lower e¤ort than their Sel…sh counterparts, exactly as in the non-communication treatments, suggesting these individuals internalize the externality their e¤ort in ‡icts on their group members before a coordination leader emerges. From a principal's perspective our results suggest that in a work environment where communication is possible a heterogeneous social-preference group leads to the lowest work e¤ort: adding a Sel…sh subject to an otherwise Other-Regarding group of workers can more likely provide a leader to coordinate on low e¤orts. 16 Finally, once a coordination leader emerges and is successful, both Sel…sh and Other-Regarding workers are providing the same minimal e¤ort, which means that there is no longer a di¤erence between their e¤orts as a function of their being Sel…sh or not. Thus, our analysis yields two more results:
Result 2a: Sel…sh subjects are more likely to lead others to coordinate on low e¤orts.
Result 2b: Without the emergence of a coordination leader, Other-Regarding subjects depress e¤orts relative to Sel…sh subjects. When a leader emerges, there are no di¤erences in e¤ort choices between Other-Regarding and Sel…sh subjects.
We performed a number of robustness checks for our main results, Results 1, 2a and 2b. First, our results are robust to clustering standard errors at the individual level instead of the group level in our individual-level analysis.
Next, given the relatively infrequent occurrence of Sel…sh individuals in our sample, we explored two alternative social preference measures. Under the …rst one a subject was classi…ed as Sel…sh when he or she kept, on average, more than 90% of the endowment in dictator menus 1-9 (instead of 100%). Using this classi…cation we observe groups with 0, 1, 2 and 3 Sel…sh group members under both treatments. Using this less stringent de…nition of Sel…sh we …nd that the magnitude of the coe¢ cient estimates on Sel…sh decreases, but stays signi…cant. However, for the group level regression, the coe¢ cient estimate on # Sel…sh is no longer signi…cant. Also, while we still observe Sel…sh becoming Min-E¤ort leaders at a higher rate than Other-Regarding, this di¤erence becomes insigni…cant. Under the second measure we conduct individual-level regressions using the average endowment keep in rounds 1-9 directly in our regressions. Our results under this measure are qualitatively unchanged. Thus, Result 1 as well as 2a and 2b are also supported under these two alternative approaches. In addition, since e¤ort choices are constrained to be between 1 and 12; we re-run our analysis using a Tobit panel model. We …nd these results are qualitatively the same. We also conducted our individual level analysis controlling for gender, education major, and risk preferences, and …nd the results qualitatively unchanged. Furthermore, none of these additional controls show consistent patterns throughout the analysis. Since the environment we study is dynamic with …xed matching, subjects can respond to past e¤ort choices of their group members. Controlling for the social preferences of the group members can account for some of this path dependence in our analysis, though it is clearly imperfect. Thus, we …nally conduct our analysis including lagged e¤ort choices of all group members. Both own and other's lagged e¤ort are signi…cant and important predictors of individual e¤ort choices. Nonetheless, our previous social preference parameters are still signi…cant, although attenuated since we are now controlling for past choices.
Propensity to "Collude"
Thus far we have been focussing on the relationship between social preferences and depressed e¤orts. Depressed e¤orts can of course also be a consequence of collusion. While we are naturally unable to observe our subjects'strategies directly, we take an indirect approach and measure the frequency of "collusive"outcomes consistent with coordination on minimum e¤orts: That is, all three players coordinate on e¤orts of 1 (i.e., e¤orts of (1; 1; 1)). We additionally include as "collusive outcome" the setting where all three players coordinate on the outcome of two players choosing e¤ort of 1 while a third player chooses maximal (payo¤) e¤ort of 12; and then the players alternate the player who gets the maximal payo¤. This latter form of coordinating on low e¤orts is only witnessed in the Chat treatment where subjects were allowed to coordinate via chat. 17 Figure 5 depicts the dynamics of groups achieving the "collusive"outcome in the Chat treatment. Here, we separate groups by the number of Sel…sh members (groups with 0; 1; or 2 Sel…sh members). Similar to our results on e¤orts from Section 5.3, when chat is available, groups with 1 Sel…sh member are more likely to exhibit collusive outcomes than groups with no Sel…sh members. When we expand the de…nition of "collusion"to include the case of the group cycling e¤orts of (1; 1; 12) across players, we again …nd groups with 1 Sel…sh member are more successful at achieving the collusive outcome than groups with no Sel…sh members. Note though that the fraction of groups choosing the turn-taking strategy (1; 1; 12) is similar for groups with one or no Sel…sh group member, which means that this outcome does not seem to be related to social preferences.
Comparing the results in Figure 5 to Figure 3 leads to an interesting observation. Even though groups with one Sel…sh member are more likely to collude, average e¤ort is quantitatively not very di¤erent from a group with no Sel…sh (3.2 vs. 4.1). As already explained in Section 5.3 the reason for this is that in the "pre-collusion phase" groups with no Sel…sh members put in lower e¤orts than groups with one Sel…sh member (average e¤ort is 5.4 in a group of only Other-Regarding vs. 7.5 in a group with one Sel…sh prior to the emergence of a Min-E¤ort Leader). This further corroborates our result that social preferences seem to matter in complex ways when communication is possible: Sel…sh individuals play an important role in facilitating coordination on the collusive outcome (Hypotheses 2 and 3) while Other-Regarding have a tendency to put in lower e¤orts even absent collusive motives (Hypothesis 1). Thus, we summarize our …nal primary result, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3:
Result 3: With communication, the propensity to "collude" is greater with one Sel…sh group member than with no Sel…sh group members
For the No Chat treatment, coordinating on a "collusive outcome" was more di¢ cult, since subjects were not able to chat. As shown in Table 6 , we …nd for this setting that only 1 out of 21 groups end up with minimum e¤orts in the last 3 periods and only if the group has no Sel…sh members. One other group with no Sel…sh group members managed to sustain (1; 1; 1) for 3 periods during the course of the game, but then reverted back to higher e¤ort. If we expand the de…nition of "collusive" outcome to include two subjective cases of "collusion" (we report their behavior in the appendix), then we …nd one additional group with no Sel…sh members and one additional group with 1 Sel…sh member successfully "collude"by the end of the game. It seems that collusion is not a main driver of behavior in this treatment and results seem more consistent with the predictions of the one-shot game.
# Sel…sh
Propensity to "collude" Propensity to "collude" group members on (1; 1; 1) (self-classi…cation) 0 (14 groups) 7% 14% 1 (5 groups) 0% 20% 2 (2 group) 0% 0% 
Robot Treatment
This treatment is similar to the No Chat treatment in the sense that subjects cannot communicate but are permitted to observe the e¤orts and payo¤s of their group members after each period. The crucial di¤erence is that in stage 2, instead of randomly pairing subjects to each other, we paired them to two simulated subjects we call "robots." 18 In particular, we programmed 42 robot subjects who react to past e¤ort decisions by approximating what human subjects did in the No Chat treatment. Speci…cally, each "robot" chooses current period e¤ort based on last period's own e¤ort and e¤ort choices of the other two subjects in the same way the human subject did in previous No Chat treatments. Crucial to this treatment is that subject's e¤ort choices no longer impose a negative externality on other players, since the robots receive no payo¤s. Thus, the fundamental di¤erence between the No Chat and the Robot treatment is that the latter attempts to "turn o¤" subjects' social preferences since their actions no longer a¤ect any other human. Note, however, that social preferences are not completely absent: the robots' choices simulate decisions by participants whose social preferences did matter. Thus, subjects'decisions can re ‡ect beliefs about the past subjects'social preferences. This is, in fact, helpful for us, as it allows us to distinguish an alternative hypothesis: "Sel…sh"subjects di¤er in their beliefs about their group members' (re-)actions from "Other-Regarding" subjects. If this were the case, we should still see a di¤erence between Sel…sh and Other-Regarding e¤ort choices in this treatment. Di¤erences in e¤ort should vanish in this treatment, however, if beliefs about other players'social preferences do not play a role in depressing own e¤ort choices. Furthermore, other potential confounds such as skill di¤erences or di¤erences in patience between "Sel…sh" and "Other-Regarding" are also not "turned o¤"by this treatment, allowing us further to test the appropriateness of our initial categorization. We …rst compare subject behavior for the No Chat treatment and the Robot treatment graphically. Figure 6 depicts the e¤ort pro…les over the 29 periods of play by treatment for Sel…sh and Other-Regarding individuals. We …nd that in the …rst half of the relative performance stage (16 periods from periods 12 to 27) the e¤ort of Sel…sh and Other-Regarding subjects in the Robot treatment is not statistically di¤erent (t-test, p-value 0.21), supporting the validity of our categorization. There is some e¤ort divergence in the intermediate term though, and then by the end of the relative performance stage, e¤orts of di¤erent social types converge back to similar e¤ort levels. In fact, in the last 5 rounds a t-test cannot reject equality of e¤orts (pvalue 0.16). Interestingly, e¤orts of all social preference types in the Robot treatment converge towards the e¤orts of Sel…sh subjects in the No Chat treatment.
Thus, while predictions from Hypothesis 4, are borne out in the …rst half, we …nd only partial evidence of equal behavior between Sel…sh and Other-Regarding players for the entire last half of the relative performance game in the Robot treatment. Perhaps, subjects forgot that they were playing robot subjects and began behaving as if they were playing human subjects. We did attempt to minimize this possibility by reminding subjects on each e¤ort-entry screen that their e¤ort choice will not a¤ect the payo¤s of any participants. Unfortunately, we cannot rule out that subjects disregarded this message after 15 periods. It nonetheless does seem these results suggest that beliefs are not driving the di¤erence in choices for di¤erent types of players: beliefs should loom largest in creating di¤erences at the beginning of the relative-performance game before they converge based on experience. However, we observe just the opposite pattern. In short, we …nd weak evidence for Hypothesis 4. If we instead analyze individual rather than average aggregate e¤ort choices, which may mask individual behavior, we …nd the same pattern of similar e¤ort choices across social preference types. Table 7 reports the results of regressing individual e¤ort on individual's and group members' social preference types for the No Chat and the Robot treatment for all periods and periods 30-40. The coe¢ cient estimate for Sel…sh is smaller in magnitude than in the No Chat treatment and is no longer signi…cant, though we do note the sample size is smaller in the Robot treatment.
Result 4: When a subject's action a¤ects a machine's success rather than a human's success, Sel…sh and Other-Regarding subjects seem to behave similarly These suggestive results from the Robot treatment provide evidence at least consistent with the idea that social preferences matter in creating and sustaining noncompetitive e¤orts.
Conclusion
We studied how an important dimension of worker heterogeneity a¤ects the performance of those subject to relative performance incentives. In particular, we found that a basic form of social preferences, the degree of other-regardingness, is substantially linked to reduced e¤ort choices, but in a complex way. First, subjects categorized as Sel…sh are more likely to coordinate their group members to exercise minimal e¤orts, when communication is available. Second, before the emergence of such leaders, subjects categorized as other-regarding exert lower levels of e¤ort-an average of over 30% lower e¤ort. Thus, when communication is available, a group that is heterogenous in social preferences can most successfully create and sustain very low e¤orts over those groups with no Sel…sh members. Finally, when communication is not available, groups of Other-Regarding subjects produce the lowest levels of e¤ort. Since we …nd little evidence of collusive outcomes, this is again consistent with the idea that Other-Regarding individuals internalize their e¤orts' negative externality imposed on other people's payo¤s.
To further validate our …ndings, we also attempted to "switch o¤" subjects'social preferences through our Robot treatment. For this experiment, we simulated the responses of human subjects via machine, thus removing a player's negative externality. By the end of the treatment, Other-Regarding subjects seemed to act like Sel…sh subjects, suggesting that Other-Regarding people internalize their e¤ort choice externality when it is imposed on others through relative performance incentives.
Our …ndings suggest that for organizations attracting more other-regarding workers (e.g., …rms engaged in corporate social responsibility or non-pro…t …rms), relative performance incentives are unlikely to be as e¤ective as they are for other organizations. For …rms using relative incentive pay, screening workers for particular positions according to their social preferences could improve performance. Human resource departments often provide potential workers with psychological-based exams. These could readily incorporate explicit measures of other-regardingness. Similarly, information obtained from resumes, such as a potential worker's involvement in philanthropic activities, could shed light on a worker's degree of other-regardingness.
We note that we did not consider the case where workers might value their …rm's payo¤. Thus, our results can be seen as applying to settings where ownership is dispersed or the worker is removed from the top of the hierarchy. Finally, our measure of leadership is endogenous to the e¤ort exerted in each group. It is an interesting challenge to design an experiment in which leadership varies with incentives and analyze how it relates to social preferences.
Although our setting only allows for the possibility of valuing negative externalities, to the extent that workers also value their positive externalities, other-regarding preferences could mitigate the free rider problem amongst teams. That is, a team of workers with Other-Regarding preferences that receive a share of the common output are more likely to provide higher outputs, as they further value their e¤ort's positive e¤ects on their team members. We leave these topics for future research. 
Appendix
Examples of Decisions
We begin with some examples to illustrate subjects' behavior. Figure 7 illustrates the patterns of decisions across time. In the …rst stage (periods 1 to 9), we observe the number of tokens each player in the group keeps for him or herself (measured on the left y-axis). In the second stage, (periods 12 to 40) we observe the choice of e¤ort ranging from 1 to 12 (measured on the right y-axis). 19 Each of the three group members is represented by a di¤erent symbol -a circle, a triangle and a cross.
Starting with Panel 1 we observe a heterogeneous pattern of keeping in the …rst stage: One subject keeps everything to himself, while the others share almost equally. Thus, this group consists of one Sel…sh and two Other-Regarding subjects. Furthermore, it provides an example of a "perfect"collusive outcome in the Chat treatment:
Subjects coordinate on minimal e¤ort during almost the entire second stage (i.e., the e¤ort choice stage).
Coordination on minimum e¤ort (1; 1; 1) also occurs absent communication. Panel 2 provides an example in the No Chat treatment on how subjects slowly manage to coordinate on lower e¤orts. Panel 3 shows a group from the Chat treatment. In this case, behavior in the second stage is surprising: Subjects alternate between providing maximal and minimal e¤ort. In each period a di¤erent subject reaps the rents of outperforming the other subjects. With the help of the chat, they perfectly coordinate on this synchronized play. Although this does not allow the subjects to reach the maximal group payo¤, this form of coordinating still leads to high payo¤s relative to the one-shot Nash outcome. About 20% of groups in the Chat treatment exhibit a pattern like this, at least part of the time.
Finally, communication does not guarantee payo¤-maximizing coordination. Our last example, Panel 4 provides a case in point. In this group from the Chat treatment, subjects choose the maximal e¤orts in almost every round.
Broader Social Preference Classi…cations
In this section we explore two alternative social preference categorizations. In particular we will use dictator menus 1-11 to classify subjects into di¤erent types depending on their choices. First we follow Andreoni and Miller (2002) and use menus 1-9 to broaden the category of Other-Regarding into subjects who tend to give more when the price of giving increases (we call them Complements) and subjects which tend to react by giving less (we call these individuals Substitutes). The idea is that the former represents the motive of fairness, while the latter represents the motive of e¢ciency. Thus, menus 1-9 measure whether a subject values fairness or e¢ ciency under favorable inequality. In a second analysis, we use dictator menus 10-11 to see whether subjects have an aversion to unfavorable inequality (i.e., unfavorable in terms of their own payo¤ relative to others). In the following, we provide more detail on the these categorization procedures, as well as some additional analysis using these expanded categories.
Complements vs. Substitutes
We use decision menus 1 to 9 (see Table 2 for an overview) to classify participants as "Sel…sh", "Complement" (Rawlsian) or "Substitute" (Utilitarian). To do so, we …rst compute the relative giving rates of an archetypal Sel…sh, Utilitarian and Rawlsian individual according to the preferences in Table 8 . We denote player i's monetary payo¤ as i and the total number of players n: Thus, an archetypal Selfish type is only interested in her own monetary payo¤. In contrast, an archetypal Rawlsian player only values the minimal monetary payo¤ of all of her group member's payo¤s. Finally, an archetypical Substitute simply maximizes her group's total monetary payo¤. Given to 1 (Selfish) Given to 2 (Selfish) Given to 1 (Substitute) Given to 2 (Substitute) Given to 1 (Complement) Given to 2 (Complement) Figure 8 : Giving rates by social preference types.
To categorize subjects, we then measure the Euclidian distance from each of the participants'decisions to each of these archetypes'decisions. We compute such distance for each choice and then we compare the average distance across periods to each archetype's decision. We classify subjects as the archetype whose decision is closest to the subject's decision. 20 For treatments 1 and 2 we …nd that, for our subject population, 19% are Sel…sh, 65% are Complements and 16% are Substitutes. Consistent with Andreoni and Miller (2002) , hereafter AM, we …nd that 19% of subjects are (perfectly) Sel…sh, whereas AM …nd that 23% of subjects are perfectly Sel…sh. 7.1% of our subject are classi…ed as perfect Substitutes, while AM …nd 6.2%. In contrast to AM we only classify one subject as a perfect Complement, while they …nd 14.2% are perfect Complements. Di¤erent from AM, we do not have any "weak"Sel…sh types, as we categorize all Other-Regarding subjects (i.e., subjects that give to others) as either Complement or Substitute types. Figure 8 illustrates giving behavior under our broader categorization of social 20 Since we only use relative giving rates between the other two group members, our classi…cation does not account for the intensity of social preferences. We can control for intensity separately by including the overall giving rate of a subject. preferences types. We see that Sel…sh types, by de…nition, never give anything to their group members. In contrast, Other-Regarding types give positive amounts, on average, for every price vector. When the price of giving increases, Substitutes typically react by decreasing their giving rate, while Complements do the opposite. This is most easily seen for periods 6 to 9 where the price of giving to individual 2 is always lower than the price of giving to individual 1 as can be seen in Table 2 . Thus, as archetypal types would do, Complements react by allocating more to individual 1 while Substitutes react by allocating more to individual 2. Table 9 is analogous to Table 3 and shows the results of a regression of average group e¤ort on the number of Complements and Substitutes in a group. Both Complement and Substitute group members reduce group e¤ort relative to Sel…sh group members in the No Chat treatment by approximately .8 units. In the Chat treatment, a linear regression again does not yield signi…cant results; this is to be expected given the discussion in the main text of the confound of leadership. We will again consider the e¤ect of social preferences on leadership and explore whether it di¤ers by Complements and Substitutes. Table 10 is analogous to Table 4 . Here, we present the results of a random e¤ect panel regression model for the No Chat treatment that considers the e¤ect of own and others'social preference type on individual e¤ort. The results from our main analysis suggesting that Other-Regarding members exhibit lower e¤orts relative to more Sel…sh group members holds also when we consider our subcategories of Other-Regarding: Complements and Substitutes. Complements as well as Substitutes exhibit lower e¤ort than their Sel…sh counterparts. In fact, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that Complements and Substitutes depress e¤ort by the same magnitude (p-value 0:7102). Furthermore, we see that most of the e¤ort reduction is driven by their own preference type (i.e., around 1.5 units) while the coe¢ cients on the other group members' social preference types are of the same sign, but much smaller in magnitude and insigni…cant.
Social Preference Types Utility Sel…sh
Finally, we turn to disentangling the e¤ect of social preferences on leadership and individual e¤ort provision in the Chat treatment. Figure 9 reports the distribution of social preferences among Non-Min-E¤ort Leaders and Min-E¤ort Leaders as de…ned in Section 5.3. As before, Sel…sh are signi…cantly more likely to become Min-E¤ort Leaders (chi-squared test, p-value=0.034). The opposite is true for Complements (p-value=0.031). Finally, for Substitutes we do not …nd a signi…cant e¤ect on leadership propensity (p-value=0.678).
In order to disentangle the e¤ect of social preferences on the propensity to initiate coordination from the e¤ect on e¤ort choice, we run a random e¤ect panel regression analogous to Table 5 for the Chat treatment.
We report these results in Table 11 . The …rst column does not control for the emergence of a Min-E¤ort Leader and whether or not an individual turns out to be a Min-E¤ort Leader. The coe¢ cients on the social preferences are insigni…cant, though they do indicate an e¤ort reduction by Complements and Substitutes. Controlling Table 9 : Group composition and average group e¤ort.
(1) for the emergence of a Min-E¤ort Leader and controlling for being a Min-E¤ort Leader increases the magnitude of both coe¢ cients by approximately 1 unit, both statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. Also, the social preference types of the other group members matter. Having Complement or Substitute group members decreases own e¤ort by about 2 units as well. Overall we conclude that there is a di¤erence in the propensity to initiate coordination by Substitutes and Complements; however, e¤ort choice is relatively similar.
Unfavorable Inequality
In a second classi…cation, we use dictator menus 10-11 to di¤erentiate subjects by their propensity to reduce their own payo¤ in order to reduce unfavorable inequality. Subjects were given an allocation vector and were able to choose an exchange rate between zero and two which translated tokens into payo¤s for all group members. Thus, an exchange rate of 2 maximizes aggregate output, while an exchange rate of zero minimizes inequality. Table 12 summarizes the two menus and the decisions of subjects in Treatments 1 and 2. Overall, many subjects were willing to reduce their own payo¤ at least once to reduce inequality. Furthermore, the fraction of subjects who destroy some of their payo¤ goes up and the average exchange rate goes down when the allocation becomes more unfavorable. For our analysis, we denote a subject as Jealous when he or she chose an exchange rate of less than two in any of the two menus. In treatments 1 and 2, 67% of subjects are classi…ed as Jealous.
Using Table 13 reports the results of an OLS regression of average group e¤ort on the number of Benevolent, Spiteful and Inequity Averse with Disinterested as the omitted category analogous to Table 3 . In the Chat treatment, we do not …nd any signi…cant e¤ect of these social preferences types. In the No Chat treatment we …nd that Spiteful group members are responsible for highest group e¤ort. On average, an additional Spiteful subject increases group e¤ort by 1.5 units. We do not …nd signi…cant di¤erences for all of other social preference types.
Finally, we explore whether this extended categorization yields new insights on the propensity to initiate coordination when communication is possible. Figure 10 reports the distribution of social preferences for Non-Min-E¤ort Leaders (left panel) Finally, controlling for the emergence of a leader, as in Table 5 , we can separate the relation of social preferences and leadership emergence from general e¤ort choices. Table 14 summarizes the results. Note that we pooled Disinterested with Spiteful subjects due to the lack of observations for Disinterested in this treatment (i.e., only 2 subjects out of 63). Overall the results mirror our results from the main analysis. Inequity Averse subjects behave similar to Benevolent ones, though we only get signi…cance for the Inequity Averse. This could be driven by the lower numbers of Benevolent subjects.
Conclusion
To summarize, the main results of our two alternative categorizations are: When communication is possible, Complements are less likely to initiate cooperation through chat, while this is not the case for Substitutes.
There is (weak) evidence that especially Spiteful subjects lead to high group e¤ort provision. There is not much di¤erence between Benevolent and Inequity Averse subjects in terms of their e¤ort choices.
Spiteful subjects are most likely to become leaders, while Inequity Averse subjects are least likely.
Overall, a simple categorization into Sel…sh and Other-Regarding explains most of the variation in the data. Figure 11 shows the e¤ort choices of groups S4G1, S5G3 and S5G5 that we categorize as ultimately "colluding."Group S5G3 achieves the collusive outcome in the strictest sense-all group members choose minimal e¤ort of 1 in the …nal periods. The other two groups we subjectively categorize as coordinating on low e¤orts.
Appendix B -Subjectively Categorized Collusion
Robot Details
For this treatment, we needed to develop a program that would create a similar experience for a subject playing a computer to if she was instead playing actual (1) ( Table 14 : E¤ect of social preferences (extended categorization 2) on individual e¤ort controling for leadership (Chat treatment).
subjects. By experience we mean if the human subject played certain strategies, she would obtain similar results whether she played actual subjects or the computer. To accomplish this, we used actual subject behavior from the No Chat treatment to determine how the computer would respond to a subject's e¤ort choices in the Robot treatment. In particular, we had the computer choose e¤ort each period based on the composition of e¤orts of players in the last period. Although in practice subjects could use an entire history of play to determine their action for the current period, regression analysis shows virtually all of history's e¤ect on current choices is captured in just the last period of play. Recall each subject can choose e¤orts between 1 and 12. This provides 12 3 , or 1,728 possible e¤ort outcomes for any given period. However, most subjects only faced a small fraction of all these possible outcomes, or what we refer to as "states." Thus, we collapse the 1,728 to 27 possible states by creating a coarse partition of e¤orts. In particular, we bucket e¤ort into low (1-4 units), medium (5-8 units), or high (9-12 units). In addition, we assume a player does not care about the identity of which player provides a higher e¤ort, should they be di¤erent e¤orts. This reduces the possible "states" to 18. With this coarser partition, at least one player faced each of these possible 18 states in the No Chat treatment. Our next step is to then build a set of strategies for 63 simulated players, which are based on each of the 63 actual subjects'actions in the No Chat treatment. For each of the possible "states," we create a transition matrix for each simulated player. The transition matrix contains the simulated player's action for each of the possible 18 "states"they Figure 11 : Choices of groups classi…ed as "colluding." might face. Often a given subject had historically chosen a di¤erent action when facing the same "state." In this case, we assign a probability for taking each action based on the historical likelihood of the human subject choosing each action. In the event a subject did not face a given "state" in the No Chat treatment, we impute the simulated subject's action as the average action of all players that faced such a "state."The 13 (of 63) subjects who faced the smallest number of "states"responded to just 3 "states"and the subject who faced the most "states,"reacted to 11 "states" (out of 18). The mean of di¤erent "states"faced by a given subject was 5.2 and the median was 4. In the end, after imputation, we had created a complete transition matrix that assigned likelihood of each action for each of the 18 "states" for all 63 simulated subjects.
For the robot treatment, when subjects reached the relative performance stage, they were randomly assigned to two simulated subjects (out of the possible 63) that would react to the past period's e¤orts based on the transition matrix. For the …rst period, however, the selected simulated subject simply chose the same e¤ort as the corresponding human subject did in the No Chat treatment for the …rst period of the relative performance stage.
Before running our experiment, we wanted to make sure the simulated subjects' behavior resembled real subjects. Again, for this treatment, we were attempting to "turn o¤" social preferences by presenting subjects with the same play experience as when facing real subjects but without generating any negative externality against the payo¤s of their opponents. We performed two tests to check for the validity of our simulated subjects (i.e., robots). First, we matched the simulated subjects into the same group pairings that the human subjects experienced. For each of these 21 groups, we then ran 1000 repetitions of each group interacting over 29 periods. Table  15 reports the result of this simulation. A very common outcome for the human subjects was for groups to end with all players choosing high e¤orts. In fact, four groups all chose maximal e¤ort of 12 in the …nal period. When these four group pairings are instead played by simulated players, they end up with this maximal outcome 95%, 91%, 71%, and 23% of the time. They all end up in the "state" of (high, high, high) e¤ort (i.e., all players choosing e¤ort above 8), 60-97% of the time. In terms of the extreme outcome of e¤ort depression, colluding on e¤ort choices of (1,1,1), there is only one group of human subjects that achieved this. This one group represents 5% of all human subject groups. The simulated group of these same members ends with (1,1,1) 7% of the time and the "state"(low,low,low) e¤ort roughly 13% of the time. In contrast, this same group ends at highest e¤orts of (12, 12, 12) just .6% of the time.
A second test we conducted was to simply randomly match all simulated subjects into groups of three and then compare the distribution of these group outcomes to the distribution of actual group outcomes of human subjects in the No Chat treatment. Table 16 reports these …ndings. We did this in a series of 100, 1,000, and 10,000 repetitions of group pairings. While again just one group, or 5%, of human subject groups colluded, in our largest samples, we found 1% of simulated groups perfectly colluded (i.e. ended up in (1,1,1) e¤orts). In terms of maximal e¤ort, whereas 19% of human subject groups ended with choosing (12, 12, 12) , 17% of randomly matched robot groups experienced the same ending. For the common outcome of human subjects …nishing in groups with e¤ort choices of (high,high,high) (i.e., e¤ort all higher than 8), human subjects achieved this 43% of the time versus the robot groups did so 49% of the time. Although, frequencies are not identical to the realized draw of 21 human subject groups, we were comforted by these simulations that these robots reasonably resemble human subject behavior. 
Leader Classi…cation Details
Instructions for Subjects
Attached …le
